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SOURCES OF EXPORT FINANCING
Thomas Graham*
The aim of my speech today is to present the subject of export
financing on three broad levels. The discussion will focus first on
the sources and types of export financing. Next I will concentrate
on recent legislative action concerning export financing, and fi-
nally, I will touch on current international issues broadly affecting
United States export financing in the 1980's and beyond.
I. SOURCES OF EXPORT FINANCING
Sources of export financing have traditionally been limited to in-
stitutions that can adequately absorb the financial risks inherent
in the exporting business. In the 1980's, as in the past, these
sources generally include larger commercial banks, a handful of of-
ficial, government-sponsored organizations, and related private en-
titities working in cooperation with a government agency. I will be-
gin by discussing the two latter sources.
A. Government Export Credit Agencies and Related
Organizations
Official export credit programs are offered by the governments of
most industrial nations as a means of facilitating exports and stim-
ulating their own national economies. The official United States
export credit agency is the Export-Import Bank of the United
States, which was created in 19341 and established as an indepen-
dent government agency in 1945.2 Commonly referred to as the Ex-
imbank, this agency is authorized by statute to provide United
States exporters with financing competitive with that offered by
foreign export credit agencies to assist sales by exporters in their
*B.A., Indiana University (1965); J.D., Harvard University (1968); member of the District
of Columbia bar.
' The Export-Import Bank was created by Executive Order in 1934. Exec. Order No.
6,581 (1934), reprinted in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
76 (1934).
Congress codified the duties and activities of the Bank in 1945. Export-Import Bank
Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 78-173, 59 Stat. 526 (1945).
456 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 14:455
own nations.3 The supported transactions must provide for a rea-
sonable assurance of repayment." Eximbank is directed by statute
to supplement but not to compete with private sources of export
financing while taking into account the effect of its activities on
small business, the domestic economy, and United States
employment.'
To carry out its purposes, Eximbank has established a variety of
services.6 Through its direct credit program, the Bank makes direct
loans to foreign buyers of United States goods and services.7 In
such cases, the Bank generally requires a down payment from the
buyer, provides part of the financing from its own funds, and re-
quires private financing for the balance. In cooperation with pri-
vate insurers, the Bank also provides exporters with insurance
against political and commercial risks.8 In addition, the Bank pro-
vides financial guarantees to commercial banks financing United
States exports.9 Finally, Eximbank assists in making discount
loans available to exporters by extending advanced commitment
3 12 U.S.C.A. § 635 (West Supp. 1984). Fiscal 1983 was the Export-Import Bank's fiftieth
year. During its first 50 years, Eximbank supported $160 billion in United States export
sales. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
I Id. See also EXIMBANK PROGRAM SUMMARY 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PROGRAM
SUMMARY].
5 12 U.S.C. 635(b) (1976), amended by 12 U.S.C.A. § 635 (West Supp. 1984).
' See PROGRAM SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 1. The Eximbank offers a wide range of spe-
cific programs which adapt to the different financing needs of United States exporters.
Among these are direct loans and financial guarantees, medium-term credit programs, the
Commercial Bank Guarantee Program, the Export Credit Insurance Program, the Small
Manufacturers' Discount Loan Program, and the Export Trading Company Loan Guarantee
Program. Id. at 5-9.
Id. at 2. Direct credits and financial guarantees are long-term financing mediums availa-
ble for export transactions in which the contract value exceeds $5 million and which involve
long construction periods. This program provides financing -assistance for United States ex-
ports of heavy capital equipment as well as large-scale installations and projects abroad
which are normally financed for a term of more than five years. A typical direct credit finan-
cial package includes a cash payment of at least 15% of the value of the export contract,
and an Eximbank loan of up to 65%, up from the traditional 45 or 50%. Generally, the
Bank will not provide long-term lines of credit or support for sales to developed or rich
countries, sales of military goods or services, or sales of older generation aircraft. Id.
a Id. at 8. The Export Credit Insurance Program is conducted through the Foreign Credit
Insurance Association, which will be discussed more fully in the body of this paper. The
program in essence protects the exporter against nonpayment due to political or commercial
risks and is available to export firms of any size. Id.
Id. at 7. Eximbank, for example, provides guaranty for domestic banks and other finan-
cial institutions when they acquire medium-term export obligations from United States ex-
porters. In doing so the Bank assumes a risk such financial institutions would not be willing
to bear themselves. Id.
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for discount debt obligations that United States commercial banks
acquire. 10
Unlike its European counterparts, which act principally as insur-
ers and refinancers, Eximbank operates like a commercial bank in
that it often makes loans directly to borrowers. 1 To determine the
advisability of a loan, Eximbank assesses traditional banking crite-
ria like the viability of the project and the likelihood of repay-
ment." Most of Eximbank's borrowers are purchasers, often gov-
ernments, in lesser-developed countries.' 3 The Bank's three biggest
borrowers, for example, are Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan. 4
Although Eximbank is by far the most important export financer
in the United States, export financing and insurance are also avail-
able through several closely-related organizations. Among these
other sources of loans are the Foreign Credit Insurance Association
(FCIA), the Private Export Funding Corporation (PEFCO), and
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).' 5
The FCIA consits of some fifty of the nation's leading insurance
companies working in cooperation with the Eximbank to insure
United States exporters against political and commercial risk in
short- and medium-term transactions.'" The FCIA plays an impor-
tant role in export financing, because its programs are the primary
vehicles through which the Eximbank provides support for short-
term transactions.' 7 The FCIA also has a medium-term credit in-
surance program which offers policies to cover political and com-
mercial risks in sales of domestically manufactured goods and
quasi-capital goods.' 8
PEFCO is owned by a group of fifty-four commercial banks,
seven industrial companies, and one investment banking firm, all
I Id.
" See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
'2 See PROGRAM SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 2-3.
13 See generally Eximbank's President Urges South Korea to Make More Use of Ex-
imbank Financing, Export Financing, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 9, at 353 (Nov. 29,
1983).
" Id. At the close of fiscal year 1983, Korea had borrowed $3.4 billion in loans and loan
guarantees, compared to $2.4 billion for Mexico and $2 billion for Taiwan. Id.
"I See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-7.
16 Id. at 6-8. The programs offered through the combined efforts of the agencies include a
short-term policy which normally covers up to 95% of commercial credit risks and 100% of
political risks; a Master Policy which insures most or all of an exporter's eligible short-term
and medium-term sales; and a special FCIA policy to support the export of services such as
engineering and advertising. See PROGRAM SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 8-9.
"' Id. Short-term transactions are limited to 180 days or less. Id.
18 Id. at 9. These policies cover transactions lasting from 18 days to five years. Id.
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of which work in cooperation with Eximbank to mobilize non-bank
funds for medium- and long-terms to foreign buyers of United
States exports. 9 PEFCO generally issues loans together with the
Eximbank and commercial banks as part of a total financing pack-
age for a single export transaction."
OPIC is a self-sustaining Government corporation which insures
and, in some cases, partially finances United States private invest-
ment in developing countries.21 Guided by the principle of "mutual
benefit," OPIC seeks to assist private investments which would ac-
celerate economic growth in developing countries without causing
an adverse impact on the employment in or balance of trade of the
United States. 22 OPIC is best known for its insurance of private
United States foreign investment against the political risks of in-
convertibility of currency, loss of investment due to expropriation
by the host government, and loss due to war, revolution, or
insurrection.23
B. Other Sources of Export Financing
In addition to the larger and more widely accessible financing
facilities discussed above, export financing is also available from
sources more localized or specialized relative to the particular ex-
porter or type of product. For example, exporters may obtain
short-term financing directly from local or regional commercial
banks without the assistance of government-supported programs.
Another alternative for the smaller or medium-sized exporter is
the state-government export finance agency, a relatively recent
phenomenon in the export financing business.24 Currently estab-
lished in only a handful of states, the state-level eximbank is
designed to supplement federal government and other large-scale
financing programs in an attempt to provide resources to smaller
1" See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
20 Id. Since its creation in 1970, PEFCO has made export loan commitments in excess of
$4.1 billion. Id.
21 President Nixon created OPIC in 1971. See Exec. Order No. 11,579, 44 Fed. Reg. 1055
(1971), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191 at 369 (1979). See also 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2201
(1976).
"2 OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION: INTRODUCTION (1984). Since its inception,
OPIC has settled approximately 150 insurance claims totalling more than $400 million and
has denied only eight percent of the claims received. Id. at 2.
23 Id. at 1.
24 See Special Supplement: State Efforts to Establish Export Financing Facilities Meet
with Local Opposition, Administrative Ambivalence, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 21 at
S-2 (Aug. 30, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Supplement].
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exporters on a local or regional basis.25 Finally, the financing of
agricultural exports as a traditional function of the Department of
Agriculture represents a specialized financing source based upon
the uniqueness of agricultural commodities relative to manufac-
tured goods as items of export."8
1. Commercial Bank Financing
As a source of export financing, commercial banks generally offer
only short-term financing of 180 days or less. The two major vehi-
cles of such financing are commercial letters of credit27 and
banker's acceptances. 8
As used in export financing, a letter of credit is a written instru-
ment issued by a bank on behalf of the buyer to establish a com-
mercial credit in favor of the seller for the value of the goods to be
shipped. 9 In effect, the bank issuing the letter of credit has substi-
tuted its own credit standing for that of the buyer.30 The commer-
cial credit is never an absolute guarantee of payment to an ex-
porter; rather, it is a contractual commitment that the bank will
make payment if the exporter meets the terms and conditions of
the credit agreement. 31
The other major instrument of commercial bank financing is the
banker's acceptance, a short-term, discounted loan with a second-
ary market which allows for immediate distribution of the pro-
ceeds to the seller.32 Specifically, a banker's acceptance involves
25 Id.
20 See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
"7 See INTERNATIONAL BANKING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 290-95 (E. Roussakis ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as BANKING].
28 Id. at 295-97.
29 Id. at 289-98. Upon conclusion of a firm export sales contract, a commercial letter of
credit may be designated as the financing medium in the transaction. In such case, the
foreign buyer applies to his bank for the issuance of a commercial credit in favor of the
seller for the purpose of inducing the seller to proceed with shipment of the goods. If the
request is approved, the bank will issue an irrevocable letter of credit to the seller which
represents an agreement that the seller may look to the bank, not the buyer, to make pay-
ment if the seller complies with the terms of the sale contract. Letters of credit issued to
finance shipments require the seller to present the bills of lading, commercial invoices, and
other appropriate documents before drafts can be honored or payment realized under the
letter of credit. In any actual transaction, there will usually be more than one bank partici-
pating. In the simplest transaction, the letter of credit from the foreign bank is made paya-
ble to the seller's bank in his own country. Id.
30 Id. at 290.
31 Id. at 291.
32 Id. at 295-96. In addition to financing transactions "at sight" under a commercial letter
of credit, commercial banks also honor drafts under letters of credit that are drawn on the
1984] 459
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the bank's issuance of a letter of credit on behalf of the buyer
under which a draft will become available to the seller on a time
basis related to the shipment period which is generally no more
than 120 days. 3 The bank's acceptance of this draft manifests its
promise to pay the face amount at maturity.3 4 By selling this obli-
gation at a discount in the secondary market, the exporter can ob-
tain immediate funds while contemporaneously extending credit to
the buyer.3 5 The banker's acceptance generally offers rates lower
than that of a comparable short-term loan 3 because of its discount
feature. Not surprisingly, the use of commercial letters of credit
and banker's acceptance for short-term export financing has ex-
panded greatly with the growth of international trade.
2. Agricultural Exports
United States agricultural exports are financed through the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a financing agency organ-
ized and operated by the United States Department of Agricul-
ture. 7 The two basic types of financing currently offered by the,
CCC are export credit guarantee programs and blended credit pro-
grams, which combine the features of insurance and direct loans in
fixed ratios.3 8
Of the two types of financing, the more widely available is the
credit guarantee program, or the GSM-102, which provides both
commercial and non-commercial risk insurance of up to ninety-
eight percent of the exporter's F.O.B. or F.A.S. value. 9 This guar-
bank on a time basis, such as 30, 60, or 90 days after sight or after the date of shipment.
The acceptance by the bank of such drafts results in an obligation known as a "banker's
acceptance." When the exporter and the buyer agree on a credit calling for a draft available
at, for instance, 60 days after sight, the exporter is granting terms to the buyer. When the
seller presents his draft and documents to the paying bank, he does not expect to receive
payment at that time but instead expects the bank to accept his draft to become payment
60 days later. This draft, accepted by prime United States banks and to be drawn on United
States dollars may, if the exporter chooses, be sold immediately in the secondary market at
the current discount rate. Banker's acceptance financing must comply with Federal Reserve
Bank Regulations. Id.
31 See generally id. at 314.
34 Id. at 500.
35 Id. at 296.
s See generally id. at 295-97.
3" The CCC was created by the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, Pub. L. No.
806, 62 Stat. 1070 (1948).
'" The CCC has created these programs under the authority of Congress expressed in 15
U.S.C. § 714(c)(1982).
3' See generally FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CCC EXPORT
CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAM GSM-102 (1984).
[Vol. 14:455
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antee program is available where credit is needed to maintain do-
mestic agricultural exports to a foreign market and where a private
financial institution would be unwilling to provide financing with-
out CCC's guarantees. 0 The program is not intended to offer guar-
antees in situations where cash sales would otherwise take place.4 '
Such guarantees are often used by countries with improved finan-
cial conditions, particularly those countries achieving an economic
status above that of poverty level in terms of per capita GNP, to'
purchase on fully commercial terms.42
Less available is the CCC's blended credit program, or the GSM-
5, which provides combinations of loans and insurance in specific
ratios pre-established by the CCC for each eligible country.' 3
These blended credits are available on an extremely limited basis
at the discretion of CCC officials, because this program involves
the direct outlay of funds. 4 4 Requests for blended credits are gen-
erally made by the governments of lesser-developed countries.' 5
The selection of eligible countries is largely one of policy, and the
CCC bases its choice upon information obtained from United
States agricultural attaches abroad.' Currently, blended credits
are available only for purchasers in Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria.'7
The average ratio of insurance to direct loans is presently six to
one.
48
3. State Export Finance Agencies
The most recent source of official export financing is the state
export finance agency. In the past two years eight states' govern-
ments have established export finance organizations, most of which
resemble the Eximbank in form.' 9 As previously noted, the states
target these programs toward smaller and medium-sized exporters,
"0 Id. at 2.
I d.
42 Id.
43 See generally OFFICE OF THE GENERAL SALES MANAGER, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., REGULATIONS
COVERING EXPORT FINANCING OF SALES OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES UNDER THE COMMOD-
ITY CREDIT CORPORATION (CCC) EXPORT CREDIT SALES PROGRAM GSM-5 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as GSM-5].
14 Interview with an official of the United State Department of Agriculture (this official





" See generally Supplement, supra note 24, at S-7 - S-15.
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and local and regional banks." Critics of such programs contend
that there is no particular need for official export financing at the
state level and that the problem of small and medium-sized ex-
porters is not a lack of financing but their lack of business exper-
tise in obtaining available commercial financing."'
Although the federal government generally supports the idea of
state eximbanks as a means of supplementing the United States
Eximbank's limited resources, officials of the Bank have warned
state representatives of the tremendous financial risks involved.2
Additionally, federal government officials have repeatedly cau-
tioned state officials that any programs offered by the state must
comply with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and with
the minimum financing provisions of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development Arrangement on Guidelines for Of-
ficially Supported Export Credits.5 Thus, the states cannot pro-
ceed with their original proposals to use federal tax-exempt securi-
ties to fund their own eximbanks." The eight states which have
adopted eximbank programs are Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Min-
nesota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin."
Many other states are considering eximbank legislation.5
II. LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
Generally, most proposed federal legislation regarding export fi-
nancing focuses on the activities of the Eximbank. Recently, Con-
gress amended the Eximbank charter to include some of the most
significant statutory changes adopted in the history of the Bank.57
To appreciate fully the important new legislation, some familiarity
with basic structure and operation of the Bank, as well as its track
record to date, is necessary.
60 Id. at S-2.
See Eximbank Official Endorses State Eximbank Start-ups at New York Legislature
Hearing, 19 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 9, at 316 (May 31, 1983).
52 See Eximbank's Draper Cautions State Officials Against Heavy Involvement in Ex-
port Finance, 20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 16, at 568 (Jan. 24, 1984).
63 See Supplement, supra note 24, at S-4. This position, also taken by Eximbank officials,
stems from the Administration's concern that if states excessively subsidize exports, then
the United States position in negotiations with other OECD nations to reduce or eliminate
export financing subsidies will be seriously weakened. Id.
Id. at S-5 - S-6.
:5 See generally id. at S-7 - S-15.
56 Id.




A. Introduction: The Statutory Scheme and History of
Eximbank
When Eximbank became an independent government agency in
1945, the federal government provided it with a $1 billion start-up
fund. 8 To date Eximbank has received no other government fund-
ing, and it is in fact required by statute to be self-sustaining. 9 The
Bank receives fees for its services and obtains funds from repay-
ments of principal and interest on outstanding loans as well as
from loans made by the United States Treasury and the Federal
Financial Bank.60 Since its creation, Eximbank has supported more
than $160 billion in domestic export sales and has paid back to the
Treasury, its sole shareholder, more than the $1 billion of its initial
capitalization61
Although the Bank receives no appropriation through the annual
federal budget process, Congress does impose a limitation on the
amount of obligations which the Bank can undertake in each fiscal
year.62 Thus, it is inappropriate and misleading to say that the
Bank received congressional funding at a particular level in a par-
ticular year, for Congressional authorization establishes only the
maximum levels at which the Bank can commit its own funds. In
fiscal year 1982, for example, Eximbank ceilings were $3.5 billion
for direct loans or credit and $5.8 billion in guarantees and insur-
ance; in fiscal year 1983, direct loans or credits were limited to
$845 million, while the ceiling on guarantees and insurance was
lowered to $8.2 billion. 3 The Bank's full commitment authority is
limited by statute to $40 billion in loans, guarantees, and insurance
outstanding at any one time.64
Over the past few years, Congress has lowered Eximbank's
yearly authorization levels.6 These decreases have been attributed
partly to federal government austerity measures and partly to con-
gressional response to official criticism that the Bank, like its for-
eign counterparts, functions in such a manner as to contravene the
basic principles of free and undisturbed world trade.6 Indeed,
" 12 U.S.C.A. § 635b (West Supp. 1984).
12 U.S.C.A. § 635 (West Supp. 1984).
60 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
e' See PROGRAM SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 1.
12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b) (West Supp. 1984).
' See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
12 U.S.C.A. § 635e (a)(1) (West Supp. 1984).
" See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
" See Export Financing: Brock Says Tentative Paris Agreement is a Start but not
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traditional United States policy in this area opposes export credit
subsidization as a distortion of normal international trade flows
and supports the use of a full range of domestic and international
measures to penalize those trading partners who engage in such
subsidies.6 7 In creating the Bank, however, Congress did not intend
that its underlying function would be the matching of foreign com-
petition at every turn, and in reality the Bank has not served such
a purpose. Thus, because of its operating mandate, Eximbank has
never been fully competitive with its foreign counterparts in every
program offered.
Recently, however, the increased visibility of the use of subsi-
dized export credit financing by United States trading partners has
led to a surge of support for expanding the role of Eximbank in
domestic export sales. The precipitating event occurred in May,
1982, when the real impact of subsidized export financing was felt
for the first time on a large scale in the United States market.68
The New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) an-
nounced at that time it would place an order for 825 stainless steel
self-propelled subway rail cars with the Canadian firm of Bombar-
dier of Quebec, which had obtained 9.7% financing for a ten-year
period from the Export Development Corporation (EDC), Ca-
nada's official export credit agency.69 In choosing Bombardier, the
MTA rejected the competing bid of the Budd Company of Troy,
Michigan.7 °
The reaction within the United States government to the loss of
the bid to a foreign firm supported by government financing was
one of utter outrage.7' In the midst of a rising tide of protectionist
pressures, the New York subway car transaction represented to
many the assault of foreign subsidized export credit financing on
the jobs of American workers. Within a matter of days, both Con-
gress and the Executive Branch began to explore ways to counter-
act the preferential financing. The range of proposals considered
by Congress included increased authorization levels for Eximbank,
mandatory Eximbank funding to counteract the MTA situation,
and a general $2 billion "war chest" set aside in a separate fund
Enough, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 379, at 65 (Oct. 20, 1981).
67 Id.
'8 See MTA Subway Case May Lead to Unilateral U.S. Action on Credits, McNamara






designed to combat foreign official export credit subsidies.72
Eximbank itself became a target of renewed attack as a result of
the MTA situation. The United States business community re-
vived its familiar refrain of criticism against the Bank for focusing
more on limiting its losses than on meeting foreign financing com-
petition.7 3 Other internal pressures for Eximbank reform con-
fronted Congress in the form of growing demands for greater Ex-
imbank support for small business exports. 4
B. Statutory Reform of Eximbank
Coinciding with mounting domestic and international tensions
over export financing was the consideration by Congress in late
1983 of a legislative package providing for the continued funding
of various international financial institutions as well as the
reauthorization of Eximbank for fiscal years 1984 and beyond. On
November 18, the last day Congress was in session before its ad-
journment for the year, a compromise package was adopted. 5 Con-
gress approved legislation extending Eximbank's authority for an-
other three years, including in the compromise extensive
amendments to the Bank's present charter and dictating the most
fundamental changes in Eximbank policy in a decadee.7 Although
federal government officials desired a simple extension for the
Bank, the Eximbank measure escaped an otherwise likely veto by
virtue of its joinder with the critical International Monetary Fund
(IMF) funding supported by the Aministration 7
Perhaps the most significant statutory change is the requirement
that Eximbank be "fully competitive" with other nations in all its
programs, although it need not provide programs exactly
equivalent to those of competitor nations.7 In keeping with this
general charge, the statute specifically mandates a new medium-
term credit program competitive with those of other countries. 71
72 Id.
73 See Congress Extends Eximbank Authority as Part of IMF, Housing Legislation, 20
U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 8, at 301 (Nov. 22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Legislation].
7' See Eximbank President Seeks to Persuade Congress Bank Serves Small Businesses,
20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 5, at 164 (Nov. 1, 1983).
7 See Legislation, supra note 73.
71 Id. at 302.
77 Id.
78 Id. The statute directs that the terms and conditions of Eximbank loans should be
established so as to have the effect of neutralizing the impact of subsidized foreign credit on
international sales competition. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1984).
7' Id. § 635(a).
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Another major change lies in the Bank's authorization to use
mixed credits, a blend of official export credits and foreign aid, in
order to offer particularly concessional financing to poorer import-
ing nations.80 While Eximbank and the Agency for International
Development (AID) are directed to establish mixed credit pro-
grams, the legislation stipulates that the National Advisory Coun-
cil on International Monetary and Financial Policies (NAC) must
not only coordinate such transactions but must give them unani-
mous approval as well.8" NAC is chaired by the Secretary of Trea-
sury, and its membership includes the secretaries of Commerce
and State and representatives of the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR), AID, Eximbank, and the Federal
Reserve. 2
Members of the business community predict that scrutiny by the
Treasury Department will effectively preclude the use of mixed
credits.8 3 Government officials concede that the Treasury Depart-
ment is not supportive on the matter of mixed credits and that the
requirement of unanimous approval by the board members of NAC
will make such credits more difficult to obtain.4
Indeed, in keeping with United States international negotiating
policy, the primary goal of NAC's preliminary proposal is to phase
out the use of mixed credits except in those situations in which
they are targeted to counteract particularly objectionable foreign
mixed credit programs. 8 5 Treasury officials have stated that while
the appropriateness of the use of mixed credits will be determined
on a case-by-case basis, it will employ them aggressively against
what are essentially foreign subsidized commercial transactions.
Eximbank officials, on the other hand, caution that retaliatory use
of mixed credits, while politically attractive, does not necessarily
discourage their use by foreign governments or increase United
States exports.8 "
Use of such packages will not affect existing Eximbank criteria
SO Id. § 635q(a)(3)(A).
SI Id. § 635s(a)(2).
S Legislation, supra note 73, at 302.
83 Id.
U See Business Pleased With Eximbank Changes, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 9, at
347 (Nov. 29, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Business].
" See Federal Guidelines on Mixed Credit Program to be Ready In a Few Weeks Con-





for excluding recipient countries not considered credit-worthy or
eligible for Eximbank programs or projects yet to be funded which
would contribute to a world oversupply. Finally, Eximbank officials
have indicated that the Bank is not likely to match foreign financ-
ing where the grant by the foreign government exceeds thirty
percent.8 7
A third major area of Eximbank reform is the passage of new
statutory provisions for the support of small business.88 In fiscal
year 1984, the Bank is required to set aside six percent of its pro-
gram resources for small businesses. In 1985, this figure will in-
crease to eight percent, and by 1986 it will consume ten percent of
those resources.89 Eximbank expects to be able to meet the small
business mandate without any trouble due to its recent change in
the definition of a small business.90 Under the new system, which is
already being used by the Small Business Administration (SBA),
each industrial classification is established differently based either
on sales volume or on number of employees. Adoption of this new
definition by Eximbank in effect allows many more companies to
qualify as "small businesses."91
Thus far, the Bank has undertaken an extensive marketing and
outreach program for small businesses. In addition, prior to the en-
actment of the recent legislation, Eximbank had already taken ma-
jor steps toward accomodating smaller exporters when in July of
1983 it modified its medium-term credit program and made its
rates more competitive.9"
Less significant among the recent changes in Eximbank's struc-
ture are the provisions for a minimum of one small business repre-
sentative among the five presidential appointees to the Board of
Directors and the revival of the Advisory Committee system. Mem-
bership in the latter will increase from nine to twelve, and the re-
forms require that three of the committee members be small busi-
ness representatives appointed by the Board.9 3 In addition, while
87 Id.
88 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(1)(E)(i) (West Supp. 1984). The statute directs the Eximbank
to encourage the participation of small business in the international economy by developing
programs which give fair consideration to small businesses in the provision of export loans
and guarantees. Id.
88 Id. § 635(b)(1)(E)(v) (West Supp. 1984).
90 See Business, supra note 85, at 84.
91 Id.
92 Id.
" 12 U.S.C.A. § 635a(c)(8) (West Supp. 1984).
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the directors will continue to serve at the pleasure of the President
during their respective terms, these terms are now fixed at four
years rather than being fully contingent upon the discretion of the
President.9
Although many view the changes in Eximbank's charter as a ma-
jor victory for United States exporters, business representatives
have adopted a "wait and see" attitude with respect to the full
implications of these changes."5 Many believe that the effectiveness
of the mandate to achieve full competitiveness will depend upon
the attitude of Eximbank personnel and the diligence with which
they carry out the legislative directions. 6 Government officials
have conceded that while strong messages were sent by Congress in
this legislation, there is still much discretion left to Eximbank's
management.9 7 According to some sources, however, the very
threat of legislation has improved Eximbank's responsiveness to
exporters over the past six months.9 8
C. Other Legislative Proposals Affecting Eximbank
Except for the usual annual fights concerning expediture ceil-
ings, little congressional action affecting Eximbank is expected in
the near future. Congress is not expected to oppose the Adminis-
tration's requested 1985 Eximbank budget authority level of $3.8
billion, a figure $35 million below the 1984 authorization'. 99
Congress may, however, wish to examine Eximbank's involve-
ment in financing projects in industries such as steel or copper in
which there is world overcapacity. Recently, for example, the Bank
announced its intention to finance a major steel complex in South
Korea. °10 After receiving strong protests from other government
agencies and trade unions, the Bank postponed action to approve
the financing of the complex. 101 Eximbank officials acceded to the
opinions of the Commerce Department and USTR that more study
was needed to determine whether construction of the giant steel-
" Id. § 635(c)(8).
" See Business, supra note 85, at 84.
" Id. at 347.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 347-48.
" See House Appropriations Committee Recommends Funding for Eximbank, Foreign
Aid Programs, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 12, at 349 (Sept. 26, 1984).
100 See Eximbank Delays Action on Supporting Steel Mill After Strong Protests Made,




making project, on balance, would help or hinder the United States
economy. 12 The proposed construction of the project has increased
the domestic steel industry's concern over the third world's excess
capacity in steel, a concern which has recently escalated to the
near crisis point.10 3 Obviously, the domestic steel industry would
be particularly displeased over official government support for
even more third world steel capacity.
Critics of the proposed steel project contend that even if the
Koreans use the steel domestically as components for other prod-
ucts, those products would then be exported to the United States
where they would compete with domestically manufactured goods.
Others have argued that the proposed financing would violate the
Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act of 1979, which forbids the
use of foreign loans from 'Eximbank or OPIC to establish or ex-
pand production of any commodity for export by any foreign na-
tion if the commodity is likely to be in surplus on world markets at
the time and if the assistance will cause substantial injury to
United States producers of a similar or competing commodity.
This entire issue may surface during the next session of
Congress.104
Other likely magnets for Congressional interest in export financ-
ing are Eximbank actions on mixed credit and small business pro-
grams. If Congress does not perceive Eximbank to be making good
faith efforts to obey the reauthorization mandate in either of these
areas, response should be expected.
A final issue which may arise in the next congressional session is
Eximbank's heavy payment claims resulting from the debt
problems of Latin America and other countries. Despite all the
congressional attention directed at making the Bank more compet-
itive, there has been little scrutiny of the Bank's increasing repay-
ment problems. Related to this is the broader issue of what Ex-
imbank's role should be with regard to these high-risk, debt-ridden
countries. Congressional opposition, sparked by the Bank's $2 bil-
lion lines of credit and guarantees to Mexico and Brazil, indicates
that Eximbank's role as a "credit bridge" could lead to future con-
frontations between Congress and the Bank.1 5
102 Id. If approved, the Bank would finance the purchase of United States equipment and
materials to be used in the plant's construction with such sales presumably contributing to
United States employment and improving the economy. Id.
,03 Id. at 494.
104 Id.
10 See World Debt Problems Remain Despite IMF, World Bank Meeting Focus, 19 U.S.
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III. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
While official export credit programs like those of Eximbank
have been in existence for over half a century, such programs have
only in recent years caused much concern within the United
States. As the international business environment becomes increas-
ingly competitive, rising market interest rates greatly enhance the
attractiveness of government subsidized export financing at lower
rates. Due to increasing homogeneity in the quality and price of
many products regardless of their place of manufacture, official fi-
nancing can be the determining factor in many export sales. Thus,
the availability of subsidized export credit is often the key link to
successful competition in international markets.
Unfortunately, however, such circumstances have dramatically
increased the risk of an all out credit war among the various offi-
cial export credit agencies, as each seeks to bolster its own nation's
competitive position by lowering its financing rates. Recognizing
these pressures relative to the tremendous economic importance of
export sales, a group of industrial nations joined together in 1963
under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) to negotiate reductions in export credit
competition.0 6
A. The OECD Arrangement
After many years of difficult and fruitless negotiations, the
heightened intensity of export credit competition led the OECD
countries to agree informally in 1976 that each would apply the
same credit terms according to a hierarchy of classes of buyers." 7
In 1978, these "consensus guidelines" were incorporated in the
OECD-sponsored Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Sup-
ported Export Credit.108
The so-called OECD Arrangement is not a treaty but simply a
voluntary, non-binding understanding among the major exporting
EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 6, at 226 (Nov. 8, 1983).
6 OECD was established in 1960 with the purpose of expanding world trade. See Con-
vention: Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (Dec. 14, 1960), 12
U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 88 U.N.T.S. 0.
107 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Declaration on Inter-
national Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD Doc. C(76)99(Final)(1976), re-
printed in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 977 (1976).
'08 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ARRANGEMENT ON
GUIDELINES FOR OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED EXPORT CREDITS (Dec. 1, 1982).
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countries of the OECD."0 9 Its stated purpose is to prevent wasteful
official export credit competition in order to restore unfettered
market forces as the primary determinant of export trade. Among
other things, the Arrangement requires a minimum down payment
of fifteen percent of the export contract value of any transaction. 110
Further provisions classify countries as relatively rich, intermedi-
ate, and relatively poor based on a matrix which establishes mini-
mum interest rates and maximum repayment terms for each of the
three levels."11 Traditionally, export sales of military equipment,
agricultural commodities, aircraft, nuclear power plants, and ships
have been excluded from coverage under the Arrangement.1 "
The minimum interest rates and maximum repayment terms as
set out in the Arrangement matrix are only guidelines. Under cer-
tain circumstances, a country desiring to offer lower rates or longer
terms for an individual sale may legitimately do so under the Ar-
rangement. The term "derogation" is used in the Arrangement to
refer to this behavior, in which a country must follow certain
agreed-upon procedures in order to infringe upon the spirit of the
Agreement while not violating its letter."' When derogation is con-
templated, the derogating country must notify the other partici-
pants of the terms it intends to offer at least ten days before issu-
ing any preliminary commitment. " This advance notice allows
other participants to discuss the issue with the initiating partici-
pant and to offer terms matching those of the derogation or to in-
troduce a new derogation." 6
In an effort to bring some export credit harmonization into the
increasingly intense competition, the OECD Arrangement coun-
tries met in October of 1981. After prolonged negotiations, the par-
ticipants agreed to raise the minimum export credit rates and to
set a floor for countries in which market interest rates were below
the Arrangement floor.""
One result of the Arrangement and the 1981 negotiations has
been that established minimum interest rate levels have also be-
come the de facto maximum rates. Countries are aware that any
109 Id. at 3.
Id.
"' Id. at 3-5.
"' Id. at 11-12.
"' Id. at 8-9.
" Id. at 10.
"' Id.
"o Id. at 4-5.
1984]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
financing offer above the minimum rate will not be competitive.
Thus, the Arrangement has in effect established a ceiling as well as
a floor for interest rates and repayment terms. While the Arrange-
ment rates since 1978 have essentially remained fixed and uniform
for all currencies, market interest rates have risen dramatically by
different amounts in different countries.
Several major flaws in the Arrangement have limited its effec-
tiveness as a deterrent to subsidized international export credit
competition. One weakness lies in the extreme difficulty of altering
fixed minimum interest rates through negotiations, a problem
which prevents an accurate reflection of changes in domestic and
international money market rates. Thus, in the face of rising mar-
ket interest rates, the subsidy element in export credits has in-
creased substantially since the Arrangement took effect in 1978.
This flaw in the Arrangement has favored countries like France
which do not place budgetary restrictions on their export credit
programs.
Another shortcoming of the Arrangement is that the set interest
rates are identical for all currencies," 7 a circumstance which has
created competitive advantages and disadvantages for various
countries depending upon differences in the domestic rates for the
various currencies. For example, if the minimum rate in the Ar-
rangement is ten percent, the official export credit agency of a
country in which domestic market rates are below ten percent
must either charge a premium over domestic rates or decline to
extend credit. On the other hand, export credit agencies in coun-
tries with domestic market rates above ten percent may direct sub-
sidization of interest rates in these currencies." 8 Yet another prob-
lem arises when a member of the Arrangement opts to derogate
from its established terms. If a participant does not have the finan-
cial resources needed to match the term of the derogating party, no
relief is available under the Arrangement. This shortcoming also
works in favor of countries with no budgetary limits on their
programs.
Finally, the Arrangement has no mechanism to prevent the
problem of subsidizing the expansion of world capacity in indus-
trial sectors already characterized by severe excess capacity. Com-
117 Id.
"' See OECD Nations Unite Behind Plan to Curb Export Subsidies, U.S. Is "De-




petition to increase exports of industrial machinery has led the
major OECD countries to provide subsidized financing for steel
and textile plants in non-OECD countries. These industries are al-
ready characterized by significant overcapacity, and it is quite
likely that new plants would not be constructed if financing were
available only at market rates and terms.
B. New International Accord
These and other pressing problems were the subject of another
round of intense negotiations among the major participants in the
OECD Arrangement during the latter part of 1983. Remarkably, a
dramatic compromise was struck as the nations ultimately united
behind an ambitious plan to curb export subsidies. Under this
plan, the minimum export credit guidelines will now move auto-
matically in accordance with market interest rates." 9 While the
new guidelines permit a slight immediate increase in the subsidy
inherent in export credit programs, they also provide for the elimi-
nation of such subsidies by July 1986.120 The temporary increase
was granted in response to a request by the French government to
provide a period of adjustment and to allow the rates to go down-
ward before automatically moving upward with commercial
rates. '2 If conscientiously followed, the new accord should eventu-
ally eliminate the inequities that have occurred in the past as fi-
nancing was offered at rates fixed for all government export credits
while borrowing costs fluctuated within different ranges among dif-
ferent governments. Generally, United States officials view the
changes in the agreement as a negotiating triumph for the United
States. 22
Under the previous set of guidelines, the minimum rates for
loans of five to ten years made to rich countries were fixed at
12.4% to intermediate countries at 11.35%, and to poor countries
at ten percent.'" Then, every six months or so, the OECD coun-
tries would meet in Paris and, after much wrangling, would deter-
mine new rates.1' 4 Since the guidelines were set only for a limited
period of time, there was always the threat that no new guidelines
"i9 Id.
1o Id.
,21 Id. at 86.
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could be agreed upon and thus the entire Arrangement would col-
lapse, increasing the potential for an export credit war among na-
tions fighting to win export orders through cheap financing.' 25
Under the new fluctuating matrix of the recent accord, the rate
for loans to rich countries remains fixed at 12.4%, but the rates for
intermediate and poor countries are lowered to 10.7% and 9.5%
respectively."2 6 The semi-annual adjustments in these rates will
take place automatically in January and July of each year if the
average rate of government bonds in the "Special Drawing Rights"
currencies changes fifty basis points or more. 2 7 Thus, if the aver-
age commercial rate drops, the Arrangement rates would slide
downward by only half of the commercial rate decline. 2 ' If, how-
ever, the average commercial rate rises, rates within the new ma-
trix would move up by the full amount. In this way subsidies
would be gradually squeezed out of the present system. If neces-
sary to eliminate completely the subsidy element in the present
matrix, semi-annual adjustments would be made beginning in July
1985 and continuing through July 1986.121
Those countries which have interest rates below the present ma-
trix would follow a specially determined commercial interest refer-
ence rate (CIRR) which would be adjusted periodically. 30 The
Japanese CIRR, for example, would be ten basis points above the
current long-term prime rate, so that if the long-term prime rate
were 8.4%, the Japanese CIRR would be 8.5%. If the United
States were to become a low interest rate country, it would use the
AA bond rate, which is equivalent to the rate a strong domestic
corporation would receive in the private sector.' 3 '
The new OECD system will have important implications for the
definition of an export credit subsidy under GATT. Until now, an
export credit subsidy has been defined in accordance with the
GATT Subsidies Code, which makes note of the OECD-Arrange-
ment.8 2 Under this Code, the definition of a subsidy includes gov-
ernment assistance offered at rates which are less than the cost of
" Id. at 85-86.
I" d. at 86.
'" Such currencies belong to those nations designated by the IMF to hold special rights
to draw from its fund. See generally BANKING, supra note 27, at 302.







money to the government. Using the CIRR system, however, an
export subsidy becomes any government-supported financing of-
fered to a foreign entity at rates less than the CIRR. This rate is
usually equivalent to the commercial rate obtainable by a strong
domestic corporation, and it is also generally above the rate ob-
tainable by the government.1 31
The achievement of the new international accord will undoubt-
edly alleviate much of the pressure placed upon Eximbank through
its recent legislative mandate to become fully competitive with its
foreign counterparts. Indeed, the announcement of the new OECD
arrangement in early October of 1983 took much of the steam out
of the debate over the adoption of new legislation.13 4 Having pur-
sued the implementation of an automatic market rate system
throughout the long and difficult OECD negotiations, Eximbank
officials view the international agreement as an answer to their
prayers over the future of the Bank.13 5 Without the OECD move-
ment to market interest rates, the Bank would have faced a press-
ing dilemma in reconciling its mandate for self-sufficiency with its
new requirement of providing programs fully competitive with
those subsidized by foreign governments.
C. Current International Proposals
Other international agreements on export financing issues have
been reached in the past year. Government officials respresenting
nations exporting nuclear power plants and equipment, for exam-
ple, have reached an agreement to establish a common line on the
terms for official export financing. This agreement was forged dur-
ing talks in Paris in late December as part of the ongoing OECD
negotiations.' 36 It took effect on February 1 of 1984. As previously
mentioned, the OECD Arrangement has, until now, excluded some
commercial sectors such as nuclear power plants and equipment.
The agreement reached by the nuclear exporting countries will be
submitted to all of the twenty-two nations participating in the
OECD export credit group. If no objections are raised by the end
of January 1985, the agreement will automatically go into effect.
Export financing for agriculture, steel plants, and commercial
13 Id.
"' See Business, supra note 84, at 302.
131 See OECD Plan, supra note 118.
"' See U.S., OECD Nations Agree on Limiting Export Financing for Nuclear Plants, 20
U.S. EXPORT WEKLY (BNA) No. 13, at 496 (Jan. 3, 1984).
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aircraft was also discussed during the December negotiations, but
no definitive decisions were made. Negotiations in these areas will
continue.13
After a general discussion of the issue of mixed credits, the par-
ticipants in the December negotiations agreed to submit descrip-
tions of specific problems they are encountering due to the use of
extremely concessional mixed credits by competitor nations. Cur-
rently, the Arrangement forbids mixed credits with grant elements
of less than twenty percent, and it requires prior notification of the
other parties in the Arrangement where there is a grant element of
twenty to twenty-five percent.'38 Financing with a grant element of
twenty-five percent or more constitutes permissible "official devel-
opment assistance." In recent years, however, observers have iden-
tified numerous foreign mixed credit sales with grant elements of
less than twenty-five percent and have suggested that such offers
are nothing more than thinly disguised export subsidies. 139
The United States stance in the mixed credit negotiations, as
reflected in previously discussed positions taken in the domestic
arena, calls for a phaseout of mixed credits by the industrial na-
tions. In lieu of complete elimination, the United States supports a
higher minimum grant threshold to constitute legitimate develop-
ment financing under the Arrangement. 140 Other OECD nations
have been receptive to these efforts to tighten the guidelines. 4"
Congressional authorization of the Administration's proposed
mixed credit program before the next round of negotiations in
April 1985 would signify United States willingness to protect its
interests if progress cannot be made multilaterally.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most significant of recent issues concerning export
financing are those arising at the international level, particularly
the shift to market interest rates under the OECD Arrangement. If
implemented and maintained as planned, this new agreement
could bring an end to years of cutthroat competition among the
official export credit agencies represented within the OECD. Elimi-
nation of the subsidy element at the international level will in turn
... Id. at 497.
138 Id.
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alleviate pressure on the Eximbank to become fully competitive.
Reduced pressure over the large-scale projects that were formerly
the major target of such competition should enable Eximbank to
focus greater efforts on smaller projects and exporters.
While the rise of state eximbanks is essentially the only recent
development in new sources of export financing, new commitments
to small business exporting at the federal level may also result in
real growth in small business export support. Finally, new legisla-
tion in the area of export financing is likely to focus on the subsi-
dized financing of expansion within an industry already character-
ized by overcapacity.

